Did your brain evolve in order to understand God?
A couple of weeks back there was an intriguing article in New Scientist on how religion came to be by the Evolutionary Psychologist Robin Dunbar. He started from the assumption that originally religion didn’t exist, so sometime in our past it came to be invented. His argument is that religion requires a complicated brain to make sense, so it was a relatively recent invention. It’s all to do with orders of intentionality.
Animals don’t have religion because they only have first order intentionality. They think purely from their own position. An exception are some great apes. Chimpanzees for example can deceive. They can pretend not to notice something they want, and so not draw other chimps’ attention to it, returning to retrieve the item when the area is quieter. If I think to leave the banana to you won’t know about it, that’s second order intentionality. It means that chimpanzees have a theory of mind and have more social behaviours than your average animal.
Things get more interesting when you have three orders of intentionality. The example Dunbar uses is “I believe God wants me to act in a righteous manner.” I think that God thinks I should think about what I’m doing. Three steps and you have a capacity for personal religion.
Dunbar adds in your mind to create fourth order intentionality. In his words “I want you to believe that God wants us to act righteously.” This makes what he calls social religion possible. But he says that still doesn’t commit you anything, so a fifth order “I want you to know that we both believe that God wants us to act righteously,” is necessary for communal religion.
I think that confirms my sub-human status as I’m still having trouble following that. If I deconstruct that correctly then fourth-order intentionality is I know that you know that God knows what I’m thinking. That’s four steps and I’m happy with that. The fifth-order is I know that you know that we know that God knows what I’m thinking. Dunbar argues elsewhere that Shakespeare was doing well because he wrote in the fifth order and because that was his intention he must have been operating at sixth-order [Word Doc / HTML]. But that’s rare.
The effort in reaching these higher levels is difficult. The Social Brain Hypothesis [PDF / HTML] is that the brain had to develop the complexity to manipulate information in a social arms race. Except with more brains and fewer arms. This has advantages for the individual, but sophisticated thinkers also have an advantage as a group. Group intentionality as ordered by religion becomes possible and this may have been an advantage that archaic Homo Sapiens had over its contemporaries. He’s even got nice graphs to show it.
The graph on the left shows a linear correlation between the size of a primate’s frontal lobes in the brain and their achievable order of intentionality. The graph on the right shows (lets ignore Neanderthals for now) how increasing orders of intentionality came through evolution. Australopithecines, like apes, had second-order thought while Homo Erectus had third-order. It looks neat and I’m not convinced. Nearly every data point is interpolated rather than measured. The order of intentionality is directly proportional to measurements of cranial capacity. If the correlation is proven then that’s sound, but all we have are the three data points on the left graph to support this. What the right graph really tells us is that cranial capacity has tended to increase in species of Homo over time and that’s not huge news. It’s also a problem when we do think about Neanderthals.
Neanderthal brains were on average around 10% bigger than modern humans. That would place them slightly above us on the graph and the sheer spread of Neanderthal points compared to the one for modern humans is a bit misleading. It would suggest that Neanderthals were capable of deeper thinking than us, and that’s a difficulty because we don’t know if – or to what degree – Neanderthals were capable of symbolic thought. I have a suspicion that, like modern humans, they were capable of symbolic but like contemporary Homo sapiens they didn’t have much symbolic thought. A lot of symbolism, like cave paintings or figurines, doesn’t date till after the Neanderthals are gone. It could be that Neanderthals were victims of a Great Leap Forward in archaic humans, but it’s not certain. However much I’m willing to credit to Neanderthals, I couldn’t seriously argue they were more sophisticated thinkers than Homo sapiens. The flints found at sites are also an indicator of a degree of brain power and while they were good, they weren’t Homo sapiens. So I’m far from convinced that the linear correlation holds for Neanderthals and, if that’s the case, why should it also hold for other hominids? This objection has implications for the timing of how complex thought arose, but I don’t think it undermines his central thesis, that religion is a result of increasing complexity in the mind brought on to deal with societal stresses.
It’s an explanation that has spooky poetic qualities if you want to get mystical. The idea of being given a land to conquer by the will of the Gods is common in ancient texts, and perhaps easier if the people you’re killing don’t have the mental capacity to have Gods. If you want to follow Catholic doctrine you could argue that this was when God chose to ensoul a species. If you prefer an atheistic view you could take the view that the Neanderthals were the first victims of religion.
His recent book The Human Story expands on this in more detail and it’s been available surprisingly cheaply recently from Amazon’s marketplace thing and Abebooks.
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I think we should try to distinguish between religion and Faith.
I think of religion as a human activity which makes much mention of Faith: our experience of that which is holy, but by no means is religion that experience itself.
Religion is Faith on a trip to Las Vegas and Abu Ghraib, where it indulges its lusts and forces obedience to its will.
Referring to the article, within the orders of intentionality we see the first order common to all animals.
The second order is deception and is social in that it sees the Other as someone who must be deprived of that banana.
The third order creates religion by interpreting man’s experience of the Holy as a God who wants Righteousness much as we ourselves wanted that big,yellow,ripe banana.
The fourth order is the urge to Power, the desire to compel Others to believe as we do.
The fifth order is the actual use of Power, Politics, and Persuasion to bring Others into belief compliance.
If the Neanderthals lacked the symbolic capacity of modern man, then the lack of Art or Ideas — the idea of GOD to be precise — does not indicate that they were godless beings.
The Neanderthals may have had more charity than we would ever dream of having. They may have practiced what they did not preach.
We cannot argue from their silence to their lack of religiosity, UNLESS we actually mean that a spoken statement or painted icon is an absolute requirement for religious feeling to exist.
In my “God and Nature’s Operating System” essay found at http://Synclecron.com/Generalities.pdf, I approach your question from an odd duck perspective, that of building up a curiously different kind of hierarchy, one based on successive combinations of the two extremely fundamental operators, “coming” & “going”. You and some of your fans may find my approach of some interest — or„ at least, amusing.
Regards, YL
If you think about the data that went into the left-hand graph, the argument is not persuasive. The reason is that maximum intentionality is discrete, i.e. it takes on values of 1, 2, 3… Because of this the three data points must fall on those horizontal lines. However, not so for the frontal lobe data, which are continuous.
Even if we were to give the full benefit of the doubt and assume that absolute frontal lobe volume had a strict rank-order relationship, i.e. a bigger frontal lobe always had a higher maximum intentionality, the data are consistent with the threshold for intentionality 3 being anywhere above ~60 cm^3. For example, that graph does not rule out the possibility that a primate with 70 cm^3 of frontal lobes would have intentionality 3 — or even 4.
To put it another way: there is no good way to calibrate the vertical axis of the right-hand graph. Based on these data we could not rule out the hypothesis that Homo habilis had enough intentionality to support religion.
And then there are problems with whether intentionality or absolute frontal lobe volume are appropriate measures, or should be linear. But the flaw I point out is sufficient to create a problem for the hypothesis, at least in its current form. The idea is quite interesting, but it needs further refinement.
Studies based on total cranial capacities of fossils aren’t to be trusted for these sorts of conclusions. Quality of brains is likely to be much more important than quantity of brains.
The biggest difference in our brains from chimps is in the inferior parietal lobule, an area that takes input from multiple sensory areas and does spooky, integrative things with them, presumably contributing to how much better we are than chimps at abstraction, creativity and higher order thinking and imagery like that. There’s no way from empty skulls to know when this change from chimps happened, though the way to bet would be to say this had something to do with fully modern humans bursting on the scene in the last 100,000 with all these cave paintings and imaginative ways of doing things. I don’t suppose anyone will know much until the genes behind these differences between humans and chimps can be determined, and one can say how old each of these changes are from molecular clocks. That will be much more interesting than any of this speculation in the meantime.
100,000 years, I meant.